We consider the problem of selfish routing in a congested network shared by several users, where each user wishes to minimize the cost of its own flow. Users are atomic, in the sense that each has a nonnegligible amount of flow demand, and flows may be split over different routes. The total cost for each user is the sum of its link costs, which, in turn, may depend on the user's own flow as well as the total flow on that link. Our main interest here is network topologies that ensure uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium for any set of users and link cost functions that satisfy some mild convexity conditions. We characterize the class of two-terminal network topologies for which this uniqueness property holds, and show that it coincides with the class of nearly parallel networks that was recently shown by Milchtaich [Milchtaich, I. 2005 . Topological conditions for uniqueness of equilibrium in networks. Math. Oper. Res. 30 225-244] to ensure uniqueness in nonatomic (or Wardrop) routing games. We further show that uniqueness of the link flows holds under somewhat weaker convexity conditions, which apply to the mixed Nash-Wardrop equilibrium problem. We finally propose a generalized continuum-game formulation of the routing problem that allows for a unified treatment of atomic and nonatomic users.
1. Introduction. Congestion-prone networks have been an object of interest in engineering and operations research for more than five decades, motivated to a large extent by their applications in transportation science and, more recently, in computer communication networks. In these application domains, the network is often not centrally controlled, but rather shared by a number of users who pursue their own objectives. This has led to extensive work on the analysis of multiuser networks within the framework of game theory, and to the investigation of equilibrium concepts for these models. For a recent survey on these issues from the telecommunications perspective, see Altman et al. [3] .
We consider here the problem of competitive routing, where each user needs to deliver a given amount of flow over the network from its designated origin node to its destination. A user can choose how to divide its flow between the available routes. On each link, the user incurs a certain cost per unit flow, which, in general, will depend on the link congestion; namely, the total flow over that link. In the context of computer networks, the per unit cost is often synonymous to the link latency, a terminology that we adopt here for simplicity. The latency of a path is simply the sum of the latencies along its links.
The fundamental notion of equilibrium in transportation networks has been proposed by Wardrop [32] . Essentially, it requires all traffic to occupy paths with minimal latency. While this basic concept has been addressed by different names, including the Nash equilibrium for infinitesimal users, small user equilibrium or traffic equilibrium, we shall mostly use the term Wardrop equilibrium to distinguish it from the finite-user Nash equilibrium that is in the focus of this paper. The Wardrop equilibrium arises naturally when the flow is considered to be composed of infinitesimal users, so that the effect of each user on link congestion is negligible. This equilibrium concept is also relevant in the context of computer networks, as many of the current routing protocols focus on shortest path routing. For recent overviews of the extensive literature that concerns the Wardrop equilibrium and its variants, see, for example, Patriksson [26] , Nagurney [24] , Altman et al. [3] , and Roughgarden [29] .
When cost-optimizing users have control over nonnegligible amounts of flow, we are led to consider the standard Nash equilibrium for finitely many users. We refer to such users as large or atomic users. A flow profile is a Nash equilibrium point (NEP) if no user can reduce its own cost through a unilateral change of its own flow profile. One of the first papers to study this problem is Haurie and Marcotte [14] , which shows convergence of the Nash equilibrium to the Wardrop equilibrium as the number of users increases to infinity. Existence, uniqueness, and some basic properties of the Nash equilibrium are studied in Orda et al. [25] , Altman et al. [2] , and Altman and Kameda [1] . The notion of a mixed Nash-Wardrop equilibrium, which combines infinitesimal users with positively sized ones, is considered in Harker [13] and Boulogne et al. [6] . Efficient network design and management are considered in Korilis et al. [17, 18] , Korilis et al. [20] , Korilis et al. [19] , and El Azouzi et al. [12] , while Roughgarden and Tardos [30] bound the performance degradation relative to centralized routing (along with similar results for the Wardrop equilibrium). The convergence of some dynamic schemes to the Nash equilibrium is considered in Jiménez et al. [15] , while La and Anantharam [21] consider a repeated game version of the routing problem, and Azouzi and Altman [4] consider the addition of side constraints on link flows.
We focus here on the issue of uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in noncooperative routing with atomic users. For a two-node network with parallel links, uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium has been established under mild convexity assumptions on the link costs (Orda et al. [25] ). This result does not hold for networks of general topology, as demonstrated there through a specific counterexample. However, the question of whether there exist other network topologies for which uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium is guaranteed (under similar convexity assumptions) remained open.
For networks of general topology, uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium requires additional conditions on the cost functions. A general set of conditions is related to the notion of diagonal strict convexity, which is a wellknown sufficient condition for uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in convex (or concave) games (Rosen [28] ). These conditions were applied to the Nash routing problem in Haurie and Marcotte [14] and Orda et al. [25] . Unfortunately, those conditions do not hold in many cases of interest, for example, they are violated by popular M/M/1 latency function under significant congestion. More specific uniqueness conditions are presented in Altman et al. [2] and Altman and Kameda [1] : the first considers link latencies that are polynomial with a low enough order, while the latter establishes uniqueness under some specific symmetry conditions.
For the Wardrop equilibrium, a corresponding line of uniqueness results exists, with the requirement of link cost convexity replaced by monotonicity of the link latency. This is sufficient to guarantee uniqueness in the single-class case, but not for the multiclass problem (Dafermos and Sparrow [9] , Dafermos [8] ). Additional conditions on the costs that ensure uniqueness are considered in Dafermos [7, 8] , Altman and Kameda [1] , and Marcotte and Wynter [22] . In a recent paper, Milchtaich [23] provides a complete characterization of all two-terminal network topologies (called nearly parallel networks) for which uniqueness is guaranteed under the basic monotonicity requirement. These results are most relevant for the present paper and will be further discussed in the sequel.
The goal of this paper is to characterize those network topologies for which the Nash equilibrium is unique, for any number and size of users, as long as their link cost functions satisfy some mild convexity conditions. Our main results establish that the class of networks that satisfy this property coincides with the set of nearly parallel networks. We will also show how these uniqueness results may be extended to the joint Nash-Wardrop problem. This will first be done by observing that the Wardrop equilibrium (with a finite number of user classes) can be represented as a Nash equilibrium in our basic finite-user model, under slightly relaxed convexity assumptions. We will also introduce a continuum game model, that allows a unified and general treatment of atomic and nonatomic users.
The paper is organized as follows: In §2, we present the basic model, and repeat the definition of nearly parallel networks from Milchtaich [23] . Section 3 establishes our main results concerning uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. In §4, we extend our uniqueness analysis under somewhat relaxed conditions, and show how the Wardrop (or mixed Nash-Wardrop) equilibrium problem can be cast in terms of this model. The continuum game model is considered in §5. Section 6 offers some concluding remarks.
Model and preliminaries.
2.1. The network model. Let the network topology be specified by an undirected graph = V E , where V is a finite set of vertices (or nodes) and E is a finite set of edges. Each edge joins two distinct vertices. Thus, single-edge loops are not allowed, but more than one edge can join two vertices. Two of the vertices in this graph will be designated as terminal vertices, O (for origin) and D (for destination). We further assume that each edge belongs to some simple path (i.e., a path with no repeat vertices) from O to D. We refer to such a graph together with its O-D pair as an undirected two-terminal network.
The actual network contains directed links, and is obtained from the undirected graph by replacing each edge with two links. More precisely, an edge e between vertices u and v is split into two directed links, one from u to v and the other from v to u. Thus the resulting network is bidirectional, in the sense that each link is paired with another link of opposite direction. (We shall comment on the case of general directed networks at the end of §3. For now, note that by imposing large enough costs on some of the links, one may effectively obtain any subnetwork of the original bidirectional one.) The set of links that connect u to v is denoted by L uv , while L is the set of all links in the directed network. The following remarks concern these assumptions: (1) Assumptions A1-A3 essentially comply with the definition of type-A cost functions in Orda et al. [25] . (2) Assumption A2 means that a the link cost for each user is strictly increasing in its own flow on that link. This clearly excludes the existence of routing loops (namely, cyclic flows) in equilibrium, as cancelling such cycles will strictly decrease the cost incurred on each of the links involved.
(3) In our uniqueness proof for nearly parallel networks, Assumption A2 is used only to exclude cyclic flows (see Lemma 3.6 and its proof). Thus, if the network has no cyclic paths, or if cyclic flows are explicitly forbidden, then Assumption A2 may be dispensed with.
(4) Assumption A3 implies thatJ i l f is strictly convex in f i l . The latter property is essential for uniqueness of the best response flow of each user, without which uniqueness of the equilibrium can hardly be expected.
(5) Assumption A3 can be somewhat relaxed by requiring K i l to be only weakly increasing in f l . Uniqueness for nearly parallel networks still holds, as the proof of Proposition 3.2 uses only this weaker monotonicity property. This relaxed requirement allows, for example, to include in the model isolated users, or "high priority" ones who are not affected at all by the flows of the others (but may still affect them). We retain the stronger form of this assumption to not weaken the necessity part of Theorem 3.1.
(6) In §4, we consider in detail the consequences of relaxing the monotonicity requirement in Assumption A3 for the first argument of K i l . We mention already that uniqueness of the per user flows is no longer guaranteed in that case (even though the strict convexity ofJ Existence of an NEP in any convex network game essentially follows from standard results on convex games (see Debreu [10] or Rosen [28] ), which establish the existence of a pure-strategy NEP for any n-person game with convex compact action sets and continuous cost functions that are convex in the player's own action. See also Orda et al. [25] for details that are specific to the present model. The only fine point to note here is the requirement for compact action sets, while the feasible flow sets F i are not a priori bounded when the network contains cyclic paths. Still, since the best response flows of all users are devoid of cyclic flows (because of Assumption A2, as explained before), they can be contained within a compact convex subset of F i . Clearly, then, the set of NEPs with the users' actions restricted to these compact sets coincides the set of NEPs in the unrestricted case, and the conditions for existence of the NEP are satisfied by the former.
Under the above assumptions, the best response flow of each user (against any given flow profile of the others) is obtained through a convex optimization problem. Necessary and sufficient conditions for a flow profile to be a Nash equilibrium are therefore provided by the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions, applied to each user in turn (Orda et al. [25] ): A feasible flow profile f is a Nash equilibrium if and only if there exists a set of constants i u i ∈ I u ∈ V , so that for every link l ∈ L uv , and for every user i,
We refer to i u as the marginal cost parameters that correspond to f. Conditions (7) and (8) can also be expressed in the following path-oriented manner: For any two nodes in the network u and v, and any path p that connects u and
where p is any other path connecting u and v.
In general, the NEP of a convex network game need not be unique. Uniqueness is, however, guaranteed for certain network topologies. We refer to this property as topological uniqueness. More precisely: Definition 2.3. A network has the topological uniqueness property if the NEP is unique for any convex network game over . Consider then the extended model (as formalized in Orda et al. [25] ), where J i l takes values in ∪ . The definition of a NEPf remains the same. However, we shall make here the distinction between a finite-cost NEP, for which the equilibrium costs J i f are finite for all users, and an infinite-cost NEP, where the cost of at least one user is infinite. Evidently, such a user does not have a finite-cost response against the specified flow profiles of the others.
Assumptions A1-A3 remain the same, except that the required differentiability and monotonicity properties are naturally restricted to the effective domain of J i l ; namely, that part of the domain on which J i l is finite. We stress that J i l is still required to be continuous over its entire domain, so that no discontinuous jumps to infinity are allowed.
With these assumptions in place, the properties of any finite cost NEP are exactly the same as in the finitecost model. Consequently, all claims made in this paper regarding uniqueness of the NEP fully apply to the uniqueness of a finite-cost NEP in the infinite-cost model.
Regarding existence, the standard existence results for convex games still apply here and imply the existence of a NEP. However, to ensure existence of a finite-cost NEP, some additional assumptions are needed. Consider, for example, the following requirement (see Orda et al. [25] ):
Assumption A4. For any flow configuration f at which some user incurs infinite cost, at least one such user can modify its flow configuration so that its cost becomes finite.
This assumption clearly excludes the existence of infinite-cost NEPs, so that any NEP is a finite-cost one. For a two-terminal network, Assumption A4 is natural and easy to verify. Suppose that each link has a well-defined capacity (namely, a link flow at which the cost simultaneously becomes infinite for all users who share that link). Then Assumption A4 is satisfied if and only if the network has enough capacity to support the user demand; namely, the total capacity of any cut of the network between the source and destination nodes exceeds the total demand d = i d i .
Nearly parallel networks.
We briefly repeat here some definitions and results from Milchtaich [23] , according to which network topologies can be classified into one of two classes. The class of nearly parallel networks essentially contains the networks shown in Figure 1 , as well as serial connections of those networks. The complementary class contains all networks in which one of the basic networks shown in Figure 2 is embedded, in the following sense. Of the five networks in Figure 1 , network (e) is the most interesting, as the other four may be considered a special case of this network for routing purposes. Still, the formal definition of nearly parallel networks does require all these basic networks. Note also that only network (e) supports meaningful bidirectional traffic between the same pair of nodes (namely, on the parallel-link network between nodes A and B) given the indicated origin and destination nodes. Proposition 2.1 (Milchtaich [23] Figure 2 is embedded in the wide sense in .
To simplify terminology, from here on, we shall use the term "nearly parallel network" to refer to any network that meets condition (i) of the last proposition; namely, both to nearly parallel networks in the sense of Definition 2.5 and to serial connections thereof.
3. Uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. As shown in Orda et al. [25] , parallel-link networks possess the topological uniqueness property; namely, uniqueness of the NEP is guaranteed under Assumptions A1-A3. Our main result states that topological uniqueness (in the sense of Definition 2.3) extends to the larger class of nearly parallel networks, and only to that class.
Theorem 3.1. A two-terminal network has the topological uniqueness property if and only if is a nearly parallel network.
The proof is presented in the following subsections. The next subsection establishes some preliminary monotonicity properties that hold in parallel-link subnetworks. Subsection 3.2 establishes uniqueness of the NEP in nearly parallel networks. Subsection 3.3 then presents a basic set of counterexamples to uniqueness, and shows that they can be extended to any network that is not nearly parallel.
3.1. Monotonicity properties for parallel links. A (directed) parallel-link network consists of a set of directed links that share the same start and end node. In the sequel, we shall require certain properties of the equilibrium flows on such networks, when considered as subnetworks of a larger network. For concreteness, we refer to the parallel-link subnetwork that connects node A to B in Figure 1 (e), and accordingly denote the start and end nodes by A and B, respectively. Obviously, similar results hold also for the subnetwork of links that lead from B to A. (10) denote the total flow of user i on that network. Let f be an equilibrium flow in G. The equilibrium conditions (7) and (8) imply that for every l ∈ L AB ,
where
A . Consider two Nash equilibria over G, denoted f andf. Throughout this proof, a hat designates quantities related tof, while plain symbols refer to f.
The assertion is clearly satisfied in the first case, while Assumption A3 implies that it holds in the second case. Note that weak (rather than strict) monotonicity of K i l in f l suffices for the latter implication. To proceed, divide the users into two distinct sets
Also divide the set of links L AB into two distinct sets 
Sincef l ≤ f l and K i l is increasing in both arguments, in either case, it follows thatf
Summing up over L − AB now gives
Combining (23) and (20) 
Uniqueness for nearly parallel networks.
We next establish the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium for nearly parallel networks, as asserted in the following proposition:
. If is nearly parallel, then the NEP is unique for every convex network game I d over .
The remainder of this subsection holds the proof of this claim. To start with, if is a serial connection of the basic networks in Figure 1 , then uniqueness in is clearly equivalent to uniqueness in each one of the basic networks. Also, subdividing an edge should not change the property of topological uniqueness because each divided edge is equivalent to a single edge with the sum of the costs of its parts (obviously Assumptions A1-A3 carry over). Hence we need only show that the Nash equilibrium for each of the networks in Figure 1 is unique. Furthermore, it may be seen that networks (a)-(c) are subnetworks of (e), so that multiple equilibria in (a)-(c) may be easily induced in (e) by imposing large enough costs on its additional links. Similarly, network (d) may be reduced to (b) or (c) by unifying links e1 and e2. It is therefore sufficient to establish uniqueness for the network in Figure 1 (27) The next lemma contains several elementary claims that are needed later on, and follows directly from the monotonicity properties of the marginal costs. (28) where the equality sign follows from the observation thatf (7), the first inequality follows from the monotonicity of K, and the second inequality from (7) and (8) .
However, using (25) and (26) 
On the other hand, since K i e1 is monotone and we assume f e1 ≥ 0 and f i e1 > 0,
hence a contradiction. (b) f AB ≤ 0. In this case, (27) implies that f BA ≤ 0. Furthermore, by (25) and (26), it holds that f e2 ≤ 0 and f e4 ≥ 0. This is completely symmetrical to the previous case, and we can repeat the argument above to obtain a contradiction. It follows that f andf cannot be different; namely,f = f. Lemma 3.7. Let f andf be two equilibrium points. If f e1 ≥ 0, then f e3 ≤ 0.
Proof. If f =f, then we are done. Otherwise, it may be assumed as above that (34) holds. Assume further, by way of contradiction, that f e1 ≥ 0 and f e3 > 0. Consider the following group of users:
and the following subsets thereof:
Note that (14), and similarly define I
Furthermore, define 
Notice that from (37) and (42), for i ∈ I 2 ∪ I 5 , it holds that f i AB = 0, and therefore f i AB ≥ 0. Combining this with (45) and noting that I 1 = I 2 ∪ I 2 gives
Repeating the argument after interchanging A with B and f withf yields
Substituting (46), (47), and (43) in (27) yields
But by definition of
which is a contradiction to the assumption that f e3 > 0. Lemmas 3.6 and 3.7 together prove uniqueness of the equilibrium point in the network in Figure 1 (e) when f e1 ≥ 0. The opposite case of f e1 ≤ 0 is easily reduced to the previous one by interchanging f andf. Thus the proof of Proposition 3.1 is complete.
3.3. Counterexamples to uniqueness. For general network topologies, the NEP need not be unique. In this section, we show that a counterexample (namely, a convex network game with multiple Nash equilibria) may be found for any network that is not nearly parallel. Recall from Proposition 2.1 that in any network that is not nearly parallel, one of the networks in Figure 2 is embedded in the wide sense. We start with two basic examples.
Example 1. Consider the network in Figure 2 User d i e1 e2 e3 e4 e5
Here
and
Note that these functions are continuously differentiable. The infinity symbols in the table stand for large enough functions, so that the relevant user will never choose to use these links. Each user can thus choose to divide its flow between two different routes. User 1 can choose between e3 and e4-e5, User 2 can chose between e2-e5 and e3, and User 3 can choose between e4-e5 and e1. It is easily verified that one Nash equilibrium is obtained if each user diverts all of its flow to its first option, and another Nash equilibrium is obtained if each user diverts all of its flow to its second option. For example, in the first NEP, (9) may be verified by observing that for User 1, 
f 1 x and f 2 x are as defined in Example 1. Each user can choose how to divide its flow between link e5 and some other route, e1-e3 for User 1, e1-e4 for User 2, and e2-e3 for User 3. It may be verified as above that one Nash equilibrium is obtained when User 1 transfers all its flow through e5, while Users 2 and 3 avoid e5. Another Nash equilibrium is obtained when Users 2 and 3 ship all their demand on e5, while User 1 chooses the path e1-e3. These two examples show that multiple equilibria exist in the networks of Figure 2 (a) and 2(c). We now need to extend the examples to the other networks in Figure 2 , and then to any network in which these basic networks are embedded. To this end, we will require the considered equilibrium point to be stable with respect to small perturbations, so that the addition of serial links with small enough cost does not alter the equilibrium. We use 4.1. Multiclass Wardrop equilibrium as an atomic Nash equilibrium. Consider the same network model(2) Assumption A3 is not sufficient to ensure uniqueness of the per user flows. This is easily seen byOur argument follows in outline, but not in detail, the proofs of Lemmas 3.5 and 3.6. We fix a user i, and consider separately the following two cases: (28) to establish the strict inequality, while a weak inequality suffices in (29) . We conclude that K i e1 > K i e1 cannot hold in this case. Using the same argument for the opposite inequality and the other three links e2, e3, and e4, we obtain the required conclusion of the lemma in this case.
(b) Contrary to case (a), assume that
for some l ∈ L AB (the other cases are handled similarly). By (57), this implies thatf 
5.
A unified continuum-game model. We next introduce an extension of our selfish routing model, that treats in a unified manner both large (atomic) users, each having a positive flow demand, and a continuum of small (nonatomic) users, each of which commands an infinitesimal flow demand. As in Milchtaich [23] , we use the framework of nonatomic games (Schmeidler [31] ) to model small users. Thus, each user (large or small) is explicitly modeled as a rational decision maker with an individual cost function. This is in contrast to the definition of the Wardrop equilibrium in (55), which specifies the behavior of small users via an aggregate flow condition. Besides the unified treatment of small and large users, the model allows for a continuum of small user classes (namely, a continuum of different cost functions) alongside a discrete population of large users.
As our focus in this paper is on two-terminal networks, we present the model in this context. The extension to a general network is straightforward, the only difference being that the feasible action set for each user would then depend on its origin-destination pair. After the model is introduced, we describe the relevant uniqueness results.
Consider a two-terminal network as before. The user population is represented by a measure space I , where I is a set of users, endowed with a -algebra and a finite measure . Thus, each element i ∈ I corresponds to an individual user. The user population may be finite countably infinite or uncountable, according to the cardinality of I. The mass r i i of each user specifies its flow requirement; namely, the amount of flow that this user wishes to ship over the network. We refer to users with r i = 0 as small users, while those with r i > 0 are large (or atomic) users. By way of interpretation, zero mass does not imply that a user has no flow to ship, but rather that the effect of its flow on the total link flows is negligible (see Equation (58)).
Two specific examples of possible user populations are: (a) I = 0 1 endowed with the Lesbegue measure, which is often used as the canonical choice for nonatomic games and (b) I = i 1 i 2 i n , a finite set, with r i > 0 for i ∈ I. The latter reduces to the finite-user game of the previous sections. Taking I as the union of these two sets leads to a mixed user population.
Each user should choose how to ship its flow over available network paths. Routing decisions are specified by normalized routing variables 6. Conclusion. As networks become larger and less centralized, it is usually hard to give theoretical predictions regarding the precise operating conditions of the network. Equilibrium analysis provides a useful tool for this purpose, that can be used both for the qualitative understanding of basic phenomena, as well as for setting up the quantitative models that are essential for network management. Uniqueness of the equilibrium is important both for network analysis and management. When the equilibrium is not unique, the network behavior becomes less predictable. Simulation results, for example, cannot be relied on to give a complete picture of the network operation. From the management point of view, it is often much easier to induce desirable operating conditions (through pricing, for example) when the resulting equilibrium point is unique.
This paper provides a complete characterization of two-terminal network topologies for which the Nash equilibrium is unique, under broad conditions on the cost functions, and for any number and size of network users. Unfortunately, the class of networks for which this broad sense of uniqueness holds is somewhat restricted. Thus, alongside the verification of uniqueness for nearly parallel networks, the result also points out those network configuration that might bring about multiple equilibria.
We have not dealt in this paper with multiterminal networks, in the sense that different flows (of different users, or even of the same user) may correspond to different source and destination pairs. While either necessary or sufficient conditions may be extracted from our results, it remains open whether a complete characterization of topological uniqueness may be given for this case.
When uniqueness cannot be inferred from the network topology alone, further properties of the cost functions and user characteristics clearly come into play. The well-known diagonal strict convexity conditions (Haurie and Marcotte [14] , Orda et al. [25] ) on the cost functions are often restrictive, and one may hope to find a middle ground that combines cost function properties with other network and user characteristics. This remains an interesting direction for further research.
Finally, the proposed continuum-game model offers a convenient framework for studying various issues related to mixed Nash-Wardrop equilibria. A particular problem of interest is a general result on the convergence of the many-user Nash equilibrium to the Wardrop equilibrium.
